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Abstract
It is often stated that there are no laws in biology, where everything is contingent and could have been
otherwise, being solely the result of historical accidents. Furthermore, the customary introduction
of fundamental biological entities such as individual organisms, cells, genes, catalysts and motors
remains largely descriptive; constructive approaches involving deductive reasoning appear, in com-
parison, almost absent. As a consequence, both the logical content and principles of biology need to
be reconsidered.
The present article describes an inquiry into the foundations of biology. The foundations of bi-
ology are built in terms of elements, logic and principles, using both the language and the general
methods employed in other disciplines. This approach assumes the existence of a certain unity of
human knowledge that transcends discipline boundaries. Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason is
revised through the introduction of the complementary concepts of symmetry and asymmetry and of
necessity and contingency. This is used to explain how these four concepts are involved in the elab-
oration of theories or laws of nature. Four fundamental theories of biology are then identified: cell
theory, Darwin’s theory of natural selection, an informational theory of life (which includes Mendel’s
theory of inheritance) and a physico-chemical theory of life. Atomism and deductive reasoning are
shown to enter into the elaboration of the concepts of natural selection, individual living organisms,
cells and their reproduction, genes as well as catalysts and motors.
This work contributes to clarify the philosophical and logical structure of biology and its major
theories. This should ultimately lead to a better understanding of the origin of life, of system and
synthetic biology, and of artificial life.
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1 Introduction
Our work investigating the foundations of biology
began as a theoretical construction of the genetic
material. We observed that the fundamental con-
cept of a material basis to heredity is commonly in-
troduced through a description of the DNA double
helix, followed by another description of its repli-
cation process. [1, 2] Asking “Why DNA is such
as it is and not otherwise?”, we chose to pursue a
complementary approach: Our focus was on a con-
struction in the general deductive spirit of the work
of Crane, [3] establishing a minimal list of require-
ments that a biological device for information stor-
age should possess. The genetic material emerged
from this construction as a transient state in a
succession of invariant processes of replication.
Over the years, this work has been slowly mended
through presentations to various audiences, in re-
search seminars, meetings and courses (both at the
undergraduate and graduate levels), and has bene-
fited from the criticisms of many people. The ap-
proach is of pedagogical interest, as it improves our
intuitive understanding of the structure and func-
tion of DNA. Encouraged by the positive features
of this construction, we sought to better understand
the nature of the rules upon which it was made.
The structure of DNA, when compared to that
of the hypothetical genetic material as obtained the-
oretically, is — in a qualified sense — unique and
ideal. This conclusion contrasts with a widely held
opinion, according to which there are no laws in
biology, where everything is contingent and could
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have been otherwise, being solely the result of his-
torical accidents. It thus raises the broad question
of the role of necessity in this discipline. Asking
“Why life is such as it is and not otherwise?”, we
were inevitably induced to ponder on the founda-
tions of biology and its connection with the prob-
lems of the origin of life, of artificial life and of
synthetic biology. Finally, we came to compare this
with the foundations of other disciplines.
1.1 The foundations of knowledge
The disciplines of logic, mathematics and physics
have gone through foundational crises leading to
a deeper understanding of their elements, logic
and principles and their historical development. In
mathematics, the concept of number (for example,
real or infinite) has been revised, novel axioms as
well as constructive approaches have been intro-
duced and new measures defined (such as the mod-
ern theory of measure). In physics, the concepts
of time and of space, of mass and of energy, of
temperature, and of identity and of causality have
been reconsidered and metrology has been com-
pletely renovated. Modern physics has identified
many new elements (such as atoms as well as sub-
atomic particles), and this has required the elabo-
ration of new logical systems (in statistical physics
and in quantum mechanics). The role of probability
theory in the logic of science has grown consider-
ably. Logic itself has been transformed by Go¨del’s
work, showing that certain propositions can neither
be proved nor refuted, thus giving an unexpected
role to contingency in this discipline, and radically
transforming the concept of demonstration. Vari-
ous types of logical systems have developed in the
last century: finite or not, discrete or continuous,
multivalued or fuzzy, temporal (bearing on past and
future, on retrodiction and prediction) or describing
other modalities. As a result, the largely illusory a
priori character of logic has faded away, the pro-
cess of differentiation into diverse systems making
patent (using the wording of Quine) its naturaliza-
tion. Lastly, the broad importance of the concept of
symmetry has been grasped progressively in logic,
in mathematics, in physics, and in the elaboration
of theories or laws of nature, as further explained
below.
From this logical point of view, the disciplines
mentioned above appear to have common charac-
teristics: the importance of their deductive content,
as well as the key role played by elemental objects
in the logical inferences employed. A certain “ele-
mental logic”, bearing on items that are irreducible
and invariant, is at the heart of many constructive
approaches. This resembles the logical atomism of
Russell [4] which has been a source for modern an-
alytical philosophy.
Biology differs in several ways: It has not gone
through a foundational crisis. Furthermore, it is of-
ten claimed that biology is unique, and that con-
tingency reigns, providing the ultimate explana-
tion for everything. Such statements both deny the
existence of theories in biology and, more gener-
ally, of a unity of knowledge. The logical content,
especially deductive, of biological knowledge re-
mains uncertain. This raises the question of the
role of atomism in biology, a question having many
facets as well as ancient roots. The three great bi-
ological theories introduced in the nineteenth cen-
tury, namely cell theory, Darwin’s theory of nat-
ural selection, [5] and Mendel’s theory of inher-
itance [6, 7] were formulated at a time when the
atomic structure of matter was still being debated.
This implies that their initial formulation must be
amended in order to make room for an elemental
logic. We note that Mendel’s theory is often con-
sidered as a main root of atomism in biology, intro-
ducing implicitly the concept of particulate inher-
itance, as put forth by Fisher, [8] thus correcting
the erroneous idea of blending inheritance. [9, 10]
Yet Mendel’s “elements”, later called genes by Jo-
hannsen, [11] are now known to be compound
items rather than true units of biological informa-
tion. Furthermore, modern physical atomism origi-
nates from other sources, namely the kinetic theory
of gases and the theory of Brownian motion, and
its general consequences for biological thought re-
main to be explored.
1.2 Aim of the present work
The goal of the present work is threefold: first
to provide a succinct exposition of our work on
the foundations of biology and of the methodology
used, sketching the main arguments and major con-
clusions; secondly, to describe a research program;
thirdly, to present a pedagogical project. A com-
panion article describes theoretical constructions of
the genetic material and of proteins using the re-
sults obtained here. [12]
In the study of the foundations of biology, one
must identify elemental phenomena of the disci-
pline and describe the measures employed to un-
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derstand them and the resulting logic. At the
same time, the underlying principles must be dis-
closed, bringing into light philosophical considera-
tions. Foundations are also to be studied in histori-
cal terms.
Working on all these aspects of the founda-
tions of biology is an immense task that can not
be completed in a few years by a small group of
researchers. It constitutes a research program, sim-
ilar to the mathematical Erlangen program of Felix
Klein [13] seeking to incorporate group theory into
the study of geometry.
Finally, we also think of foundations in terms of
what we believe should be taught first, in terms of
elementary or basic phenomena, concepts and the-
ories. We have found over the years that the foun-
dations of biology can be to a large extent taught
at the undergraduate level (and even before). The
present work should, therefore, be viewed also as a
pedagogical project.
2 Results and discussion
Biology is a scientific discipline based on phenom-
ena derived from observations or experiments, on
concepts elaborated from them, and on further gen-
eralizations derived from these concepts through
theories or laws of nature. We investigate its foun-
dations using the language and the methods em-
ployed in the investigation of disciplines outside of
biology. Our approach is based on a fundamental
and general belief in the existence of a unity of hu-
man knowledge. This assumption is, nevertheless,
constantly held as a working hypothesis susceptible
of refutation.
2.1 Revising the principle of sufficient rea-
son
The question “Why is DNA such as it is and not
otherwise?” can be addressed, following Leibniz,
using the philosophical principle of sufficient rea-
son. This states that we can always provide an an-
swer to the following two questions: “Why does
something exist rather than nothing?”, and, if it ex-
ists, “Why is it as such and not otherwise?”. The
broad importance of this principle is well known:
As remarked by Enriques, [14] it constitutes a pos-
tulate of the intelligibility of reality as well as a re-
quirement for the elaboration of models, and pro-
vides rules for scientific constructions. At the same
time, its practical use is not so easily grasped. First,
this principle is constrained by the observation that,
most often, the reasons shall remain unknown to us.
This limitation illustrates the general finding that
fundamental principles never come alone, but al-
ways appear in complementary pairs, in a dialectic
manner.
Underlying the principle of sufficient reason
are the concepts of necessity and contingency and
of symmetry and asymmetry. To make the use of
the principle of sufficient reason easier, we have
broken it into four sub-principles, defining four
philosophical attitudes towards these dual couples
of antithetic concepts, illustrated in Table 1. One
can associate, for instance, symmetry with contin-
gency through the classical point of view accord-
ing to which contingency arises from ignorance, a
lack of information. Conversely, one can associate
asymmetry with necessity by observing that a phe-
nomenon, to occur, requires the absence of certain
symmetry elements, in other words, the presence
of necessary asymmetries; Thirdly, symmetries can
be taken as necessary, focusing on simplicity, econ-
omy and invariances. Fourthly, asymmetries can
be taken as contingent, focusing on imagination
and invention. These four attitudes can be used to
explain how the concepts of necessity and contin-
gency and of symmetry and asymmetry enter in the
formation of knowledge, in particular, in the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason and in the elaboration of
theories or laws of nature.
The construction of a theory describing a phe-
nomenon (or a set of phenomena) consists of two
steps: The first is the elaboration of appropriate
measures aiming at its study. Secondly, from these
measures can then be identified the invariants of the
phenomenon which include both necessary asym-
metries and compatible symmetries. Phenomenal
asymmetries can be deemed necessary according to
Curie’s asymmetry principle. [26] In a complemen-
tary manner, the set of all the symmetries compati-
ble with a phenomenon defines its symmetry group.
Such symmetries can be viewed philosophically as
being either contingent or necessary. The necessity
of symmetry in mathematics is found in a princi-
ple of symmetry, stated by Weyl, [21] according
to which any mathematical object must be charac-
terized in terms of the set of symmetries, called its
automorphism group, leaving it invariant. This rep-
resents an extension of Klein’s program for geom-
etry to the whole of mathematics and then to the
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natural sciences. The method of construction of
a theory that we follow, following Lautman, [29]
therefore aims both to extract the necessary asym-
metries from a phenomenon and to incorporate as
many symmetry elements as possible in the sym-
metry group which describes it. In this approach,
we do not construct something that actually exists,
but rather an ideal, Platonic structure. We follow
a similar approach in the theoretical construction
of a compound item. A necessary item is unique
and, if it is compound, can be assembled from ele-
mental components using the rules of construction
given above. In contrast, an item that is not neces-
sary is called contingent as it could be otherwise;
a contingent item cannot be constructed, but only
described.
The claim that everything in biology is contin-
gent raises a general philosophical problem as to
the origin of necessity (outside of biology). We
view necessity as having its sources both in logic
and symmetry considerations. In formal logic, ne-
cessity is associated with deductive reasoning (be-
ing called an apodictic necessity by Kant). [30] Ex-
tending this idea to the natural sciences, we state
that the necessary character of an inference made in
any scientific discipline is related to its content in
deductive reasoning. The inference leading, for in-
stance, to the establishment of a difference between
two objects using a measure of sufficient accuracy
possesses such a deductive character. It allows us
to hold as necessary the conclusion of non-identity.
This can explain, in part, the origin of the necessity
found in Curie’s asymmetry principle. Another ma-
jor source of necessity arises from the attitude as-
sociating it with symmetry, at the heart of modern
physics. Making symmetry necessary has the con-
sequence to confer a character of certainty to the
generalization of induction.
2.2 Biology and physical atomism
The introduction of atomism in biology is required
to deduce the existence of individual living organ-
isms (meaning literally, that cannot be divided) and
to construct plausible schemes for a process of re-
production. The basic logical tool here is derived
from Fermat’s principle of infinite (or indefinite)
descent (which, in his terms, can be used both in
a negative and in an affirmative manner). [31] The
Fermatian inference further rules-out reproduction
processes based on a constant reduction of the size
of (nestled) living organisms (as in the theory of
the “homunculus”). This was understood by Buf-
fon, [32] who, however, could not draw his ar-
gumentation to a clear conclusion as the size and
reality of atoms themselves were unknown in his
days. Another consequence of atomism is that
reproduction cannot proceed unbounded under fi-
nite resources, pointing to the necessary existence
of some sort of competition or struggle for life, a
statement that is at the basis of the theory of natu-
ral selection. One can thus conclude that physical
atomism plays a central role in the construction of
biological concepts and theories. In the following
section, we shall see how it enters in the four fun-
damental theories of life: the theory of natural se-
lection, cell theory, the informational theory of life
and the physico-chemical theory of life.
2.3 Four fundamental theories of biology
1. The theory of natural selection
The process of reproduction has two aspects: it
is a kind of multiplication, a nonlinear event, and
also a certain transmission of hereditary informa-
tion, implying a memory system. Any system in-
volving a memory requires its persistence through
time. This requirement is absolute and cannot toler-
ate even the slightest interruption, thus relying im-
plicitly on a principle of continuity (also known as
Leibniz’s law of continuity). Biology which relies
on reproduction of individuals is, therefore, based
on a pair of seemingly contradictory yet actually
complementary principles: of continuity and dis-
continuity. The simultaneous presence of both con-
tinuity and discontinuity is found in all sciences, as
observed by d’Arcy Thompson, [33] among others.
The principle of discontinuity (or atomicity) is
central to elemental logic. Continuity, on the other
hand, is also present in the theory of natural selec-
tion because living organisms are made of a very
large number of finite, minute constituents that we
perceive as a continuum. This constitutes a second
aspect of the principle of continuity illustrating a
general principle of fine division. Indeed, many
phenomena that we study are complex, involving
a large number of elementary components usually
interacting in a non-trivial manner. Elements are
often few in type yet each is present in large num-
ber, an expression of a principle of plenty, comple-
mentary to the principle of economy or parsimony.
A statistical approach to such systems is appropri-
ate, and their description can be made in a purely
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continuous manner even though a knowledge of the
underlying atomic features is essential for their full
understanding.
Darwin observed that reproduction is not an ex-
act invariance, but an approximate symmetry that
generates heritable, in general minute, differences.
[5] He then generalized by induction this empirical
finding to all living organisms. The underlying cur-
rent explanation is that both the number of heredi-
tary traits and the informational content of each one
(in terms of number of bits) are very large. Conse-
quently, this makes possible the existence of a very
large number of variations, each slight enough to be
treated as infinitesimal, compatible with the use of
a continuous description of the reproduction pro-
cess. Any individual organism must, accordingly,
be thought of as a complex network of interactions
between numerous hereditary traits and the envi-
ronment. (Our present understanding describes in
greater details this network in terms of interaction
between genes and their products: RNA, proteins
and other molecules.)
A close look at the logic behind Darwin’s the-
ory of natural selection leads to the identification of
several underlying, complementary principles and
of three main types of logical inferences:
inductive, such as the statement that the reproduc-
tion of individuals is not an exact invariance,
but an approximate symmetry that generates
heritable differences,
deductive, proving the existence of a process
called natural selection leading to the reten-
tion of certain living organisms and to the
elimination of others, is a necessary conse-
quence of the imperfection of reproduction
and of the finiteness of available resources
and
Bayesian, [16] leading (when augmented by con-
cepts elaborated in cell theory, see below) to
the parsimonious conclusion of the existence
of a unique common ancestor for all living
organisms.
The inductive as well as the key deductive compo-
nents of Darwin’s theory were identified long ago
by Julian Huxley [34] and by Leigh van Valen. [35]
More recent works, such as Mayr’s book on the his-
tory of biology or several articles written in 2009
(150 years after the publication of the Origin), dis-
cuss the logic of this theory following Huxley in
terms of five major inferences, [36–38] yet of un-
specified status (deductive, inductive or otherwise).
Natural selection defines a second law of in-
teraction between living organisms (reproduction
being the first). This invariant process provides a
constant means of dispersal, acting on all forms of
life following the last common ancestor. The ex-
istence of this common ancestor, when compared
with the immense variety of present living organ-
isms, brings to the fore the action of a principle
of divergence underlying natural selection. Natu-
ral selection explains in a parsimonious manner the
immense variety of living organisms in their total-
ity. Indeed, of all the theories conceived by man
to understand the universe, the theory of natural se-
lection stands amongst the simplest in hypotheses
and the richest in phenomena.
Finally, natural selection operates through a
constant search for extremes, both maxima and
minima, over all parameters at its disposition. We
observe the results of this search of extremes for
instance in terms of size, of largeness and minute-
ness, at the level of entire organisms (with ele-
phants and whales, for example, at one end and
prokaryotic single-cell organisms at the other). At
the cellular level, the eggs of birds are single cells
of macroscopic size; similarly, the largest neurons
are of the size of an entire animal and can be sev-
eral meters long. At the molecular level, natural
selection leads to the formation of the giant macro-
molecules of meter-long chromosomal DNA but
also to a constantly increasing repertoire of small
molecules such as secondary metabolites. At the
metabolic level, this search for extremes leads to
states of maximum as well as minimum dissipation
of energy. The overall measure of natural selec-
tion, introduced by Fisher, is called fitness and has
the dimension of the reciprocal of time. [8] The rel-
ative fitness of living organisms is to be understood
as an expression a biological principle of fine divi-
sion.
2. Cell theory
Our examination of cell theory also exploits the
principle of atomicity, and we construct cell the-
ory starting from the requirements of natural se-
lection: reproduction, imperfect transmission of
hereditary information and constant operation of
selective pressure. The feasibility of this construc-
tive approach is again based on the principle that
excludes a division ad infinitum of living organ-
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isms. Concomitantly, the theory of natural selec-
tion tells us that cells, being complex entities, are
themselves assembled from a very large number of
elements and can reasonably be described as con-
tinuous objects. Our approach is, therefore, semi-
continuous. Elaborated in this manner, cell theory
is both deductive and inductive and completes the
nineteenth century view (of Schleiden, Schwann
and others) which remained purely inductive.
The simplest cellular shape is spherical. The
process of reproduction of a cell of minimal size re-
quires cellular growth prior to a binary fission; this
combined process of growth followed by division,
that we call cell gemination, makes the spherical
symmetry of cells only approximate, as observed
d’Arcy Thompson [33] and others. Binary fission
creates a singular point of contact between two
daughter cells at the moment of separation. This
point becomes a new pole, leading to the deduc-
tion that all cells are polarized, both in space and
in time, in accordance with the principle of fine
division. (Similar statements can be found in the
literature, for instance in the work of Taddei and
coworkers [39].) We emphasize here the logic be-
hind cell theory.
Cell theory constructs both states and pro-
cesses. It defines different types of cells: the sim-
plest are those involved in ordinary uniparental or
haploid reproduction, the more complex (which
are germ cells or gametes in addition to somatic
cells) are involved in biparental or diploid repro-
duction. Cell theory states that haploid genera-
tion preceded diploid generation. Furthermore, the
common ancestor of all living organisms was uni-
cellular. It was perhaps not a isolated entity, but
a set of cells freely sharing their genomic content
that later evolved into distinct organisms. [40]
Cell theory defines the state of latent life [41],
also called cryptobiosis [42], in which living organ-
isms can survive for extended periods of time as
closed or isolated thermodynamic systems in a re-
versible, dormant stage. Cryptobiosis is both nec-
essary and universal as a potentiality at the cellular
level. Thus, at any time, a cell is either living, in a
cryptobiotic state, or dead. Cell death is a necessity
dictated by natural selection. Yet, every cell living
today is connected to the common ancestor by a
lineage of cells, all of which have escaped death.
The continuity of cellular life thus implies that cell
death, although necessary, is not universal. Cell
theory also constructs the process of programmed
cell death, necessary and universal as a potentiality
in living organisms today. Both programmed cell
death and cryptobiosis are necessary to ensure the
continuity of life across most adverse conditions.
In unicellular organisms, programmed cell death is
often an intermediate process in a pathway leading
to cryptobiosis.
3. The informational theory of life
The theory of biological inheritance or informa-
tional theory of life envisions living organisms,
their structures, their functions and their interac-
tions, in terms of information, stored or transmit-
ted, emitted or received, and involved in regulation
or control, in homeostasis [43] as well as adapta-
tion. Biology can be seen as a branch of infor-
mation and communication sciences, and of cyber-
netics. [44, 45] Biological information constitutes
a fundamental asymmetry of life (comparable with
molecular chirality, often itself called the asymme-
try of life). Information is a physical concept and
is associated with an energy cost. [46] The infor-
mational theory of life, as such, includes the study
of heredity or genetics, and we focus here on this
aspect. The theory of inheritance has its roots, in
part, in the work of Mendel in the nineteenth cen-
tury. [6,7] The logical basis of this theory, however,
was developed mostly starting in the second half of
the twentieth century.
The work of von Neumann on self-reproducing
automata offers a proof of existence of such a logic.
[47, 48] The architecture of his six-component au-
tomaton is described in Table 2 and compared
to the structure of living organisms. The self-
reproducing automaton is built from two funda-
mental, distinct components: a set of instructions
and an aggregate of smaller automata. This distinc-
tion is required in order to comply with the tempo-
ral logic of the process of reproduction. It agrees
with the necessary existence of two types of infor-
mational biopolymers and thus of a genetic code re-
lating their sequences. [49] Wigner’s “no-cloning”
theorem of quantum mechanics, furthermore, rules
out the possibility of an exact reproduction. [50,23]
Shannon’s theory of communication makes possi-
ble gradual changes through redundancy and error
correction. [19] The discontinuous or particulate
nature of inheritance, logically derived from cell
theory and from information theory, ensures a law
of conservation: the retention of the variation, at
the basis of the process of natural selection.
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One can use these ideas to construct a complete
theory of inheritance, first for the simplest living
organisms reproducing through uniparental, hap-
loid generation, then for the more complex organ-
isms reproducing through biparental, diploid gen-
eration. Assuming by simplicity that gametes pos-
sess a haploid system of inheritance, one can de-
duce first the existence of a system of diploid in-
heritance in zygotes and somatic cells and then es-
tablish rigorously Mendel’s law of inheritance.
The concepts of genetic linkage and genetic re-
combination can be introduced to be used later in
a construction of the genetic material. The seven
pairs of characters investigated by Mendel are
transmitted independently of one another. Later ex-
periments with sweet peas [51] have shown that for
certain pairs of genes a preferred co-transmission
can be observed, a phenomenon called genetic link-
age, leading to the elaboration of the concept of
linkage group. In complex living organisms such as
metazoan, the genes usually clustered into several
linkage groups. In simpler prokaryotic unicellular
organisms, such as the bacterium Escherichia coli,
there can exist a single linkage group. [52] This lat-
ter discovery relied in fact on the exploitation of the
newly discovered phenomenon of genetic recom-
bination in bacterium. [53] Indeed, investigations
of genetic linkage revealed the plasticity of link-
age groups and led to the elaboration of the concept
of genetic recombination according to which genes
do not occupy fixed positions, but can occasionally
move either within a given linkage group or to a dif-
ferent linkage group. This has been observed both
in eukaryotes and in prokaryotes. We shall formu-
late a generalization of these observations stating
that recombination is a universal process in living
organisms. The process of genetic recombination
points to the existence of cut and paste tools op-
erating on the genetic material within or between
linkage groups.
4. The physico-chemical theory of life
The physico-chemical theory of life seeks to un-
derstand the process of natural selection using the
concepts of physics and chemistry. This theory
includes molecular biology (and extends into the
infra-molecular level, as both nuclear and elec-
tronic properties have to be considered, as well as
into the supra-molecular level, indeed up to the
macroscopic level). We focus here on the ele-
mental level. This theory tries to explain the high
rates, high yields and high specificity of biochemi-
cal reactions and how efficient transport processes
operate. It is through the study of the biochem-
istry, physical chemistry and biophysics of nucleic
acids that we came to study the general questions
raised here. Indeed, we described methods cou-
pling chemical reactions and phase transitions that
increase the rates of nucleic-acid hybridization and
cyclization by many thousand-fold. These inves-
tigations fostered our initial interest in heteroge-
neous biochemistry and for a principle of fine di-
vision underlying biochemical fitness. This princi-
ple of fine division manifests itself through comple-
mentariness, of heterogeneity (such as phase het-
erogeneity), anisotropy (such as molecular chiral-
ity [54]) and of fine division of time. It can be un-
derstood as an extension of the Carnot principle for
heat engines [27] to other sources of energy.
Chemical catalysis (a concept introduced by
Berzelius and developed by Ostwald, Fischer, Paul-
ing, among others) also involves the principle
of fine division as it operates through a tight,
supramolecular complementariness between the
catalyst and a transition state conformation occur-
ring in the chemical reaction. The most general
definition of a catalyst is that of an invariant trans-
forming a virtual process allowed by the laws of
thermodynamics, but which will not necessarily oc-
cur, into a phenomenon observable within a finite
time. Both the biological process of reproduction
and von Neumann’s self-replicating automaton are
instances of (auto)catalysis. Catalysis defines a cy-
cle, conveniently drawn in the Krebs representa-
tion. [55] In a Carnot cycle, for instance, the mo-
tor itself is a catalyst and is not consumed; In an-
other example, a carbon nucleus serves as the cat-
alyst in the cyclic process of energy production in
stars. [56] Chemical catalysts contribute to fitness
by increasing the rates of biochemical reactions and
are thus necessary biological entities. Catalysis (as
originally perceived by Berzelius [57]) brings to-
gether the fields of engineering, chemistry and bi-
ology, illustrating a unity of knowledge combining
the sciences of nature with the sciences of the arti-
ficial.
The physico-chemical theory of life investi-
gates the relation between motion and life. The
identification of movement with life and stillness
with death is ancient. The observation of the phe-
nomenon of Brownian motion in microscopic stud-
ies by Robert Brown [58, 59] renewed the ques-
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tion of this relationship. Unger and Dujardin dis-
tinguished Brownian motion from active cell mo-
tion, killing cells either by heating or through the
addition of poisons. [60–62] Further questions are
raised today by the study of (supramolecular) bio-
logical motors.
Mitchell’s chemiosmotic theory endeavors to
unite transport and metabolism into a vectorial
metabolism and introduces Curie’s asymmetry
principle in biochemistry. [63] Osmoenzymes (in
the language of Mitchell [64, 65]), now called bio-
logical motors, perform various types of mechan-
ical work, improving, in particular, the transport
of compounds beyond that permitted by Brownian
motion, being, therefore, just as catalysts, universal
and necessary biological entities.
The physico-chemical theory of natural selec-
tion explains the extraordinary stability of the com-
ponents of living organisms in the state of crypto-
biosis. The necessary existence of specific macro-
molecules, heteropolymers, whether catalysts, mo-
tors or informational devices for the storage of
hereditary information, can then be established
deductively. Such approaches can explain the
unique character of essential biological structures
and functions, leading, in particular, to a clearer,
intuitive understanding of the structures of proteins
and nucleic acids, described in a separate article.
3 Conclusions and Perspectives
Our approach adapts the methods used in the in-
vestigation of other disciplines to biology, and our
emphasis is on the methods themselves as much as
on results. Underlying this approach is a convic-
tion of the existence of a unity of knowledge, which
finds its main manifestation in a science of research
(Leibniz Ars inveniendi [66] or Peirce’s Economy
of Research [67]), describing methods shared by all
disciplines. Yet, the tree of knowledge also grows
through the many disciplinary branches, the exis-
tence of which can be explained in terms of an in-
creased efficiency associated with a division of in-
tellectual labor at the basis of economical employ-
ment of thought. We find here again fundamental
principles coming as complementary pairs: a prin-
ciple of diversity expressing a pluralism coupled
with a principle of unity, as well as the idea that
efficiency is associated with a certain fine division,
whether in the process of natural selection or in the
economy of knowledge.
The belief in the unity of knowledge, common
to students of methods embodied by Leibniz and
Peirce, is shared by a large number of thinkers (for
instance Schro¨dinger, [68] E. O. Wilson [69], Eigen
[70], and others), even in an age of increasing spe-
cialization. One can mention here the current inter-
est in transdisciplinarity and convergence.
The unity of human knowledge is also found
in the foundations of biology, which are observed
here to rely on elemental phenomena, on pairs of
complementary principles (of continuity and dis-
continuity or atomicity, of symmetry and asym-
metry, of necessity and contingency, of parsimony
and plenty, ...), and on logic, in the same man-
ner as do other sciences of nature. We have seen,
for instance, how the foundations of biology ulti-
mately rely through atomism on an elemental logic.
Maxwell’s conclusion on the need to incorporate
atomism in biological thought remains as timely to-
day as it was almost a century and a half ago. [71]
The foundations of biology provide this discipline
both with elements, laws of interaction and theo-
ries, making possible a deductive formulation of
the concept of natural selection and then of cells,
genes, catalysts and motors. They will explain in a
plausible manner the necessary and unique charac-
ter of essential biological structures and functions.
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Table 1: Four attitudes towards necessity and contingency, symmetry and asymmetry
Contingency Necessity
Symmetry
“Incompletism”
Principle of bounded rationality [15]
Principle of indifference [16, 17]
Principle of maximum
entropy [18–20]
“Symmetrism”
Principle of simplicity or economy
Principle of symmetry
Conservation laws, selection rules,
symmetries as “non-observables” [21–24]
Asymmetry
“Inventism”
Gedanken experiments of physics
Mathematical Brownian motion [25]
Sciences of the artificial [15]
“Phenomenism”
Curie’s principle of asymmetry [26]
Heat engines [27]
Brownian motion and molecular reality [28]
The four attitude may be viewed as forming a modified modal square of opposition (yet we stress their comple-
mentary — and not their contradictory — nature).
Incompletism associates symmetry with asymmetry, in a principle of “non-sufficient” reason or indifference. Both
in physics and in information theory, ignorance, viewed as a lack of information, can prevent the establish-
ment of the uniqueness of a phenomenon. This is treated through a maximization of the relevant (Gibbs-
Boltzmann or Shannon) entropies.
Phenomenism associates asymmetry with necessity. The presence of necessary asymmetries for the occurrence
of a phenomenon constitutes Curie’s asymmetry principle (sometimes erroneously called Curie’s symmetry
principle). For instance, a macroscopic heat engine requires: (1) a transfer between two reservoirs differing
in temperature (a space heterogeneity), (2) an absence of time reversibility (time orientation) and (3) an
oriented heat flow from the hot to the cold reservoir. This Carnot principle can be viewed as a manifestation
of a principle of division of the simplest type relating division with efficiency. A Curie analysis of the
phenomenon of the Brownian motion of a colloidal particle in a fluid similarly reveals two fundamental
spatial and temporal asymmetries. It establishes the granularity of the surrounding fluid, its discrete, atomic
(or molecular) structure (and, therefore, the disruption of the symmetry of scale invariance); it also reveals
the constant motion of this fluid (in agreement with the kinetic theory of heat).
Symmetrism asserts the necessity of symmetry at the foundations of laws of nature. It arises first through the
principle of simplicity or economy: when several laws can describe the same phenomenon, we must retain
the one that is the simplest, most parsimonious, devoid of redundancy. Simplicity can be here defined and
measured through algorithmic information theory (as developed by Solomonoff, Kolmogorov and Chaitin).
The information content of a phenomenon is formally given by the size of the smallest algorithm character-
izing it. In symmetrism, phenomena are not described through necessary asymmetries, but instead through
a group of compatible symmetries, either continuous or discrete, and the focus is on conservation laws or se-
lection rules. Symmetries are called “non-observables”, and, accordingly, asymmetries become associated
observables as in phenomenism.
Inventism associates asymmetry with contingency. Here, one decides to suppress some of the necessary asym-
metries of phenomenon, treating them as contingent. It releases imagination and contributes to creative
thinking at large. Gedanken (thought) experiments of physics lead to the prediction of phenomena, thus to
conjectural asymmetries. It can also be found in all disciplines that are not constrained by natural phenom-
ena such mathematics or the sciences of the artificial. Mathematical Brownian motion (also called a Wiener
process) can be obtained as the continuous limit of a discrete random walk on a lattice and possesses the
property of unbounded scale and time invariance. Yet both scale and time invariance are incompatible with
the phenomenon of Brownian motion and thus mathematical Brownian motion does not describe physical
reality.
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Table 2: The self-replicating automaton of von Neumann
Component Function in the automaton Structural counterpart in living organisms
ID The instruction describing automaton D DNA
A Constructing automaton Transcription and translation machinery
B Copying automaton DNA replication machinery
C Controlling automaton Regulation of replication and gene expression
D The aggregate A+B+C A cell without its genetic material
E The aggregate A+B+C+ ID The cell, the simplest living organism
The automaton of von Neumann consists of five automata and one instruction. This instruction ID is itself
an aggregate of simple parts and acts as the tape in a Turing computing automaton. The automaton B
makes a copy of ID: “the copying mechanism B performs the fundamental act of reproduction, the
duplication of the genetic material, which is clearly the fundamental operation in the multiplication of
living cells.” [47] When the constructing automaton A is furnished with the instruction ID, the controlling
automaton “C will first cause A to construct the automaton which is described by this instruction ID.
Next C will cause B to copy the instruction ID referred to above, and insert the copy into the automaton
referred to above, which has just been constructed by A. Finally, C will separate this construction from
the system A+B+C and ‘turn it loose’ as an independent entity.” [47] In order to function, the aggregate
D = A+B+C must be furnished with the instruction ID describing this very automaton D, thus forming
the self-reproducing automaton E. “E is clearly self-reproductive. Note that no vicious circle is involved.
The decisive step occurs in E, when the instruction ID, describing D, is constructed and attached to D.
When the construction (the copying) of ID called for, D exists already, and it is in no wise modified by
the construction of ID. ID is simply added to form E. Thus there is a definite chronological and logical
order in which D and ID have to be formed, and the process is legitimate and proper according to the
rules of logic.” [47]
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